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This research investigates evidence and tests the hypothesis that the linkages 
between the defense acquisition management system, the requirements process, and the 
budgeting system are not sufficiently defined to enable the success of acquisition programs. 
These disconnects contribute to weapons systems cost overruns, schedule delays, and 
performance problems, and are exacerbated by the ever-changing global security 
environment and rapid pace of technological advancement. Through historical research, 
qualitative and quantitative analyses, and a comprehensive review of current policies and 
procedures, this research illuminates these areas of disconnect and proposes specific 
recommendations to fix them.  
Keywords: Acquisition, Budgeting, Decision-making, Programming, Requirements 
The primary purpose of this research was to investigate how well the Defense 
Acquisition Management System interfaces with the requirements and budgeting systems of 
the Department of Defense (DoD). The United States of America possesses the finest 
weapons systems in the world. However, the same cannot be said for the systems that 
enable the Pentagon to acquire those weapons systems. Cost overruns, schedule delays, 
and operational test failures testify to numerous severed connections among the acquisition 
management, requirements, and budgeting systems (commonly referred to as the three 
decision support systems). The ever-changing global security environment and the rapid 
pace of technological change only serve to exacerbate these problems. 
For the Pentagon to earn a reputation for excellence in acquiring weapons systems, 
these decision support systems must operate with far better coordination and demonstrate 
that they can procure the right equipment, within reasonable timeframes, and at affordable 
prices. This research began with an investigation into the intricacies of the acquisition 
management, requirements, and budgeting systems. Next, interactions between these three 
decision support systems were illuminated to uncover areas of misalignment and 
disconnect. Recent initiatives to correct these problems were also identified. Finally, 






A January 2006 report of the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment (DAPA) 
described the three decision support systems as: 
a highly complex mechanism that is fragmented in its operation. Further, the findings 
we developed indicated that differences in the theory and practice of acquisition, 
divergent values among the acquisition community, and changes in the security 
environment have driven the requirements, acquisition, and budget processes further 
apart, and have inserted significant instability into the acquisition system. In theory, 
new weapons systems are delivered as the result of the integrated actions of the 
three interdependent processes whose operations are held together by the 
significant efforts of the organizations, workforce, and the industrial partnerships that 
manage them. In practice, however, these processes and practitioners often operate 
independent of one another. Uncoordinated changes in each of the processes often 
cause unintended negative consequences that magnify the effects of disruptions in 
any one area.1 (DAPA, 2006, pp. 4-5) 
                                                
1. This problem has not been fixed. Writing in the January/February 2009 issue of Foreign Affairs, Secretary of 
Defense Robert M. Gates (2009) called for a reassessment of priorities within the Department of Defense: 
The defining principle of the Pentagon's new National Defense Strategy is balance. The United States 
cannot expect to eliminate national security risks through higher defense budgets, to do everything and 
buy everything. The Department of Defense must set priorities and consider inescapable tradeoffs and 
opportunity costs.  
The strategy strives for balance in three areas: between trying to prevail in current conflicts and 
preparing for other contingencies, between institutionalizing capabilities such as counterinsurgency 
and foreign military assistance and maintaining the United States' existing conventional and strategic 
technological edge against other military forces, and between retaining those cultural traits that have 
made the U.S. armed forces successful and shedding those that hamper their ability to do what needs to 
be done. (p. 28)  




















DoD Decision Support Systems 
Figure 1 highlights the areas of interaction between the Defense Acquisition 
Management System, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), 
and the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) system. Coordinated 
management decisions at these interfaces are essential for the success of any acquisition 
program. Thus, this research began by seeking to understand the reasons why these three 
decision support systems were first established and how acquisition programs are affected 
by the decisions made within and between these systems today. 
Defense Acquisition Management System (DAMS): Stratified 
Decision-Making 
Decision-making in today’s Defense Acquisition Management System (DAMS) can 
be traced to 1986. The late David Packard, then president of Hewlett-Packard, was selected 
by Ronald Reagan to lead the President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense 
Management. Better known as the Packard Commission, its interim report of April 1986 
recommended the appointment of both DoD-level and Service Acquisition Executives 
(SAEs). The SAEs would appoint Program Executive Officers (PEOs) under their authority 
that would be responsible for a manageable number of acquisition programs and project 
managers. By design, the chain of authority from the project manager, through the PEO, to 
the SAE was short. The basic premise was that defense acquisition needed to be 






Another feature of the acquisition management system is that it classifies programs 
for higher levels of oversight based upon expected development or production expenditures. 
An Acquisition Category I (ACAT I) Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP), requiring 
oversight by the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) or DoD Component Acquisition 
Executive (CAE), if so delegated, is a program that is expected to require in excess of $365 
million of Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) funds and/or $2.19 billion 


















































Figure 1. The Defense Acquisition Management System 
Unlike the PPBE process that is calendar-driven or the JCIDS which is needs-driven, 
the acquisition management system is event-driven. All acquisition programs are managed 
through a series of sequential phases and milestone reviews (Figure 2). To successfully 
move from one phase to the next, a program must have demonstrated or completed the 
program-specific exit criteria for the current phase and must also have met the statutory and 
regulatory entrance criteria for the next phase. The appointed Milestone Decision Authority 
(MDA) makes the “go/no-go” decision based on the evidence presented at the milestone 
review. 
The effect of having a higher-level decision-maker for MDAPs is that 31% of the 
department’s programmed Research, Development, and Acquisition (RDA) funds are under 
the authority of one decision-maker—the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 





programmed RDA funds are under the control of the Services and Defense Agencies.2  The 
total number of decision-makers with MDA for lower-priority acquisition programs is over 
40.3 
In addition, analysis of acquisition decision memoranda (ADMs) documenting the 
decisions of the DAE for MDAPs reveals that 36% of the ADM contained language with 
impact on the requirements decision-making process, and 66% of the ADMs contained 
actions affecting decisions in the budgeting process.4 Obviously, decisions made on the 
more numerous lower acquisition category programs also ripple into the requirements and 
budgeting processes at higher rates.  
JCIDS: Centralizing the Validation of Capability Documents to 
Ensure “Jointness” 
Historically, the military Services have had their own systems for the approval of 
weapons systems requirements. However, in 1976 the Office of Federal Procurement Policy 
published Circular A-109 that required a Mission Area Analysis to determine the need for a 
particular weapons system (OMB, 1976). In compliance with A-109, the Services were 
required to perform this analysis and prepare a mission needs statement to document the 
need at the front end of the acquisition process (Fox & Field, 1988, p. 46). Eventually, to 
ensure that requirements were not duplicated between the Services and to prompt 
interoperability and joint operations, the Joint Staff got involved. In the early 1990s, they 
required the Services to adopt a single document format for the Operational Requirements 
Document (ORD). In 2003, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 
(JCIDS) process was created to identify the capabilities and associated operational 
performance criteria required by the joint warfighter. JCIDS also supports the statutory 
responsibility of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) to validate joint 
warfighting requirements. 
                                                
2 In Future Years Defense Program 2008-2013 (FYDP 2008-2013), the total obligation 
authority for RDT&E and Procurement was $1,154 billion. By virtue of the fact that the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics is the MDA for MDAPs, the OSD has 
control over acquisition decisions totaling $362 billion, or about 31% of the total obligation authority in 
FYDP 08-13. On the other hand, the Services make decisions on about $792 billion, or about 69% of 
the total obligation authority for RDT&E and procurement in FYDP 08-13 (DoD, 2008c, Table 1-9, p. 
13; DAMIR, n.d., MDAP/MAIS Selected Acquisition Report query, FYDP 08-13). 
3 Each Service and Defense Agency has an Acquisition Executive (AE) with MDA. In addition, 
all PEOs have MDA. The total number of PEOs is 35 (Army-11; Navy-13; Air Force-11). 




4 The Defense Acquisition Management System (DAMS) uses ADMs as records of the 
decision made by the AE. For the purposes of this research, ADMs for the following weapons 
systems were reviewed: Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (6 ADMs); Future Combat System (10 
ADMs); Global Hawk (12 ADMs); Joint Strike Fighter (13 ADMs); and Littoral Combat Ship (3 ADMs). 
In total, 44 ADMs were reviewed. Of these, 36% (16 ADMs) contained actions that would require 
involvement of the JCIDS. In addition, 66% (29 ADMs) contained actions that would impact upon the 
















Figure 2. Capabilities-based Assessment 
Fundamental to JCIDS is Capabilities-based Assessment (CBA) (Figure 3). Unlike 
the more predictable threats of the Cold War that the Pentagon could anticipate and prepare 
for, threats today emerge on a daily basis, and are often asymmetrical to our existing 
capabilities. CBA seeks to find solutions to these emerging threats by changing Doctrine, 
Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities 
(DOTMLPF) (CJCS, 2009, p. GL-3). The CBA process produces initial capability, capability 
development, and capability production documents (ICD, CDD, and CPD). These 
documents guide the technology development, engineering and manufacturing 
development, and production and deployment phases of the acquisition framework, 
respectively (Figure 2). 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3170.01G is explicit 
regarding how JCIDS interfaces with the two other decision support systems:  
The JCIDS process supports the acquisition process by identifying and assessing 
capability needs and associated performance criteria to be used as a basis for 
acquiring the right capabilities, including the right systems. These capability needs 
then serve as the basis for the development and production of systems to fill those 
needs. Additionally, it provides the PPBE process with affordability advice by 
assessing the development and production life-cycle cost. (CJCS, 2009, pp. A-1, A-
2) 
An approved ICD summarizes the CBA process, describes the capability gaps, and 
identifies potential solutions. The ICD is taken to a Materiel Development Decision (MDD), 
where it is reviewed and validated in order to start the acquisition process. A favorable MDD 
leads into the Materiel Solution Analysis phase, which is prior to Milestone A. In this phase, 
an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) is prepared, based upon the broad type of materiel 
solution preferred in the ICD (i.e., information system, evolutionary development of an 
existing capability, or a transformational approach) (CJCS, 2009, p. A-3). Each alternative 





provides linkage to the budgeting process. So, it is important to note that the information in 
the ICD drives the AoA process. The ICD also informs the technology development strategy, 
the test and evaluation strategy, and the systems engineering plan—all key documents for 
guiding the technology development phase prior to program initiation at Milestone B. 
 
Figure 3. Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution 
PPBE: Then and Now 
In the spring of 2008, the American Society of Military Comptrollers (ASMC) 
surveyed 575 members of the defense financial management community about the PPBE 
process (Figure 4). Agreement was almost universal that PPBE was the best method to link 
performance and budgeting, “and a strong sentiment to fully implement the system as 
designed” (ASMC & Grant Thornton, 2008, p. 1). So, just what was PPBE originally 
designed to do? And, has the DoD implemented PPBE in a way that allows it to do what it 
was designed to do? To find answers to these questions, one must go back to the 
beginnings of PPBE (then PPBS), during the era of Defense Secretary Robert S. 
McNamara. 
In 1961, President Kennedy’s initial instructions to McNamara were “to determine 
what forces were required and to procure and support them as economically as possible” 
(McNamara, 1964, p. 14). Developed by cost analysts at the RAND Corporation during the 
1950s, program budgeting was just what the Pentagon needed to link budget inputs to 
capability outcomes and to centralize long-range planning and financial decision-making 





Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), and its fundamental purpose was to unify 
annual budgets and nonfinancial longer range planning.  In the age of the nuclear bomb, the 
task of long-range planning was to calculate the needed effects or outputs that had to be 
produced by military forces and weapons systems in order to prevail. Budgeted funds for 
these military forces and weapons systems came from the funding appropriations for military 
personnel, research and development, procurement, and operations and maintenance. Yet, 
budgets are resource inputs. Moreover, because of the long development cycles for modern 
weapons systems, annual budgeting was not a useful planning tool. The key for McNamara, 
and the objective of PPBS, was to link the planning outputs to the appropriated funds inputs 
through the construct of defined program elements within a 5-year force structure and 
financial program (Novick, 1962, p. 2). 
As originally envisioned, planning within the PPBS was to be a comparative analysis 
of the projected costs and effectiveness of feasible alternatives. The example used by David 
Novick, one of the developers of program budgeting, is the comparison of the merits of 
buying more Polaris submarines versus Minuteman missile squadrons. Both systems could 
deliver nuclear warheads. The comparison between the two alternatives involved the 
methodical examination of the cost estimates for manpower, equipment, and facilities, and 
the expected military benefits (capability outcomes) derived from the systems (Novick, 1962, 
p. 6). Today, comparatively little analysis to this level of detail takes place in the planning 
phase of PPBE. Up until 2006, planning was simply an effort to turn the National Security 
Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy (NDS), National Military Strategy (NMS), and the 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) into guidance from which the Services could develop 
their Program Objective Memoranda (POMs). Such a shallow planning effort resulted in 
guidance that was not specific enough, in terms of priorities and quantities, for the 
programming of adequate resources for weapons systems acquisitions. Here is but one of 
many examples. 
The National Security Strategy (Clinton, 2000) was silent on the role of the military in 
finding and taking the fight to terrorists. While the document discusses the need for the 
military to help deter terrorism and respond in retribution to terrorist attacks, the mission of 
finding and destroying terrorist organizations is not mentioned. Thus, the FYDP for fiscal 
years 2002-2007, prepared by the Pentagon in fiscal year 2000, lacked a vision for the 
weapons systems and equipment necessary to prosecute an offensive global war on terror 
(Paparone, 2008, p. 157).5 As the world changes at an unprecedented pace, casting a 
                                                
5  COL Christopher R. Paparone, USA (Ret.), makes an argument that the Joint Vision 2020, 
published in June 2000, focused on defensive force protection from terrorists, not on the use of 
military forces to combat terrorism in an offensive way, which was the case after September 11, 2001. 
While the Joint Vision 2020 was not a PPBE document, per se, his point is applicable. Combating 
terrorists offensively is not seen in the National Security Strategy prior to 9/11. This is not the only 
failure on the part of past presidential administrations in providing meaningful strategic priorities. The 
2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) failed to envision the invasion of Iraq on March 20, 2003, the 
fall of Baghdad, and the associated requirements for nation building that were thrust onto the military. 
The 2004 National Military Strategy (NMS) failed to envision the need for massive humanitarian aid in 
the wake of the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 24, 2004, and the associated requirements that 
the military would need for logistical support across the shores of devastated islands and coastal 
regions. Similarly, the 2005 National Defense Strategy (NDS) failed to envision that North Korea 
would test fire missiles over the Sea of Japan on July 4, 2006, and subsequently explode a nuclear 
device in the mountains on October 9, 2006. The 2005 NDS makes no mention of our nation’s need 





meaningful strategic vision becomes more and more problematic. Without meaningful 
strategic vision, the acquisition management system may continue to acquire programs that 
will no longer be needed—and may fail to start programs that will be needed. The Obama 
Administration has yet to set clear national security priorities. As a result, the Pentagon 
began in early 2009 the planning phase for fiscal years 2012-2017 without the benefit of an 
NSS. Clearly, no one knows what the future will hold. However, planning for a future we 
cannot see and attempting to bring that illusion to the future fight, with all the associated 
weapons systems acquisition requirements, is clearly folly if not patently dangerous. Yet, 
this is the current planning process upon which the Pentagon justifies and builds its 6-year 
defense program. 
The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 requires that each 
government agency establish a results-oriented management approach to strategically 
allocate resources on the basis of performance (US Congress, 1993). In assessing the 
implementation of GPRA, the Government Accountability Office has criticized the DoD for 
not establishing goals or timelines for accountability and for the measurement of progress 
toward implementation. The DoD implemented a risk management framework in its strategic 
plan—the 2001 QDR report (GAO, 2005, p. 8). However, it was not until 2003 that the DoD 
adopted the balanced scorecard approach to implement risk management. The GAO 
criticized the DoD for not integrating this framework with other decision-making support 
processes. Specifically, the GAO said that to be effective, risk-based and results-oriented 
management approaches have to be integrated into the usual cycle of agency decision-
making. The GAO presumed that without this level of integration, a mismatch between 
programs and budgets would continue, and a proportional rather than strategic allocation of 
resources would go to the Services.6 In addition, the Congress would not have insight as to 
the risks and trade-offs made during the Pentagon’s investment decision-making (GAO, 
2005, p. 5). 
                                                
6 The Government Accountability Office says that even though the DoD has adopted a risk 
management planning framework and balanced scorecard approach to programming for outcomes, 
the percentage of total obligation authority in the FYDP, by Service, has remained relatively 
unchanged. The GAO provided the following figures in its report Defense Management: Additional 
Actions Needed to Enhance DoD’s Risk-based Approach for Making Resource Decisions (GAO-06-
13): 
Table 1. Military Service and Defense-wide Percentage of the 2005 and 2006 Future 
Years Defense Programs 
(GAO, 2005, p. 16) 
 2005 Percentage of 
FYDP 
2006 Percentage of 
FYDP 
Percentage Change by 
Department 
Department of the Army   24.23  24.63  0.40
Department of the Navy   29.75  29.47  -0.28
Department of the Air Force   29.80  29.82  0.02
Defense-wide   16.22  16.08  -0.14







Chartered to examine how the DoD develops, resources, and provides joint 
capabilities, the Joint Capabilities Study Team (also called the Aldridge Study) reported 
these findings to Defense Secretary Rumsfeld in 2004: “Services dominate the current 
requirements process…; Service planning does not consider the full range of solutions 
available to meet joint warfighting needs…; and, the resourcing function focuses senior 
leadership effort on fixing problems at the end of the process, rather than being involved 
early in the planning process.” They also found that programming guidance exceeds 
available resources (DoD, 2004, p. iii). Others have also identified this programming 
guidance “gap” (Christie, 2008, p. 196; Church & Warner, 2009, p. 82; Johnson, 2003, p. 9). 
The Aldridge Study proposed a four-step process: strategy, enhanced planning, 
resourcing, and execution and accountability. The strategy step involved the combatant 
commanders and answered the question: “What to do?” The enhanced planning and 
resourcing steps answered the question: “How to do it?” The execution and accountability 
step answered the question: “How well did we do?” Formal process review points for the 
Secretary of Defense were proposed after each of the four steps (DoD, 2004, p. v).  
Many of the recommendations from the Aldridge Study were implemented. Most 
notably, the Enhanced Planning Process (EPP) was made a phase of the Strategic Planning 
Process, and the EPP is to be approved by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense. 
Moreover, the Joint Programming Guidance is to document the decisions resulting from the 
EPP phase (DoD, 2006, p. 2). The Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) 
already had responsibility as the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) lead for 
coordinating the program review of the PPBE process. The only problem with this new 
assignment is that it appears to conflict with the responsibilities of the Under Secretary of 
Defense (Policy), who has overall responsibility for coordinating the PPBE planning phase 
(DoD, 2003, p. 5). 
Another problem for PPBE is that developing and finally enacting the first year of the 
6-year program takes a long time. The program (termed Future Years Defense Program or 
FYDP) is put together only once every 2 years, during even numbered years. For example, 
in calendar year 2010, the Pentagon will put together the 6-year program for fiscal years 
(FY) 2012 through 2017. However, the Services began working on their portions of that FY 
2012-2017 program in the middle of calendar year 2009—more than 3 years before the first 
year funds for FY 2012 will be appropriated by the Congress. The next opportunity to make 
major changes to the program is in calendar year 2012 when the program for FY 2014-2019 
will be accepted by the Pentagon. Changes to the program are possible during the odd 
numbered years. However, these changes are usually limited to necessary fact-of-life 
adjustments. New starts (or stops) are generally not considered in the odd numbered years. 
Thus, the programming phase of the PPBE process suffers from false precision. Even if the 
vision of the future were correctly identified in the planning phase, programming for 
weapons systems new starts can only be done every other year. Moreover, funds requested 
are for use more than three or more years hence. Inevitably, projections for weapons 
systems costs that far in advance of execution are bound to be flawed. Yet, the process 
demands precision, whether or not that precision has any meaning (McCaffery & Jones, 
2005, p. 159).  
As originally envisioned, Secretary McNamara expected to conduct a continuous 
review of the entire defense program. In other words, he expected to have an up-to-date 5-
year force structure and financial program at all times. McNamara’s PPBS had a program 
change control system in which variations from approved cost estimates required advance 





and operations—each relating to the key decision points in the life of a weapon system. The 
program change control system was first applied to 200 of the most important material 
systems. Milestone schedules were prepared for these systems, and actual progress was 
reported on a monthly basis, including the need for corrective action or revision to the 
financial plan (Novick, 1962, pp. 7-10). Such is not the case today. The FYDP is open for 
changes only twice a year—in August when POMs (or changes to the previous POMs) are 
submitted by the Services to OSD, and at the end of the combined program and budget 
review once resource management decisions have been made and the defense budget is 
finalized for the Office of Management and Budget. 
In his first year as Defense Secretary, McNamara was heavily involved in the cost-
effectiveness and requirements studies of the planning phase of PPBS. Known as 
“McNamara’s 100 Trombones,” he assigned about 100 requirements projects to the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, the Services, and various elements of OSD. These planning studies were 
truly participative in nature and required a significant time commitment from McNamara, but 
they resulted in detailed acquisition programming guidance for the Services. For example, in 
his first year, McNamara made decisions on the number of strategic missiles and bombers 
for the next decade. He also decided on the airlift and sealift needed to support contingency 
war plans and the most cost-effective way of replacing worn out ground equipment for the 
Army (Hitch, 1965, pp. 74-75). 
Senior leader involvement in today’s PPBE process has typically been toward the 
end of the programming phase rather than in the earlier planning phase. This is not the 
optimum time for these senior leaders to enter the PPBE decision-making process. 
Moreover, failing to make the tough decisions up front in the planning phase only delays 
them into late in the programming phase (Johnson, 2003, pp. 10-11). Decisions become 
harder to make during the final stages of programming because less discretionary funding is 
available, and earlier decisions will need to be reconsidered. Such late decision-making on 
weapons systems acquisition terminations was typical in past PPBE cycles. However, as 
demonstrated by Defense Secretary Gates during the 2010 budget deliberations, he may 
get more involved up front and make these types of decisions early in the planning phase of 
PPBE.  
Today, PPBE fiscal and programming guidance is usually late in arriving to the 
Services. While no directive or instruction establishes a date for issuance of 
fiscal/programming guidance, issuance dates for the past two PPBE cycles were March 14, 
2008, for POM 10-15; and May 7, 2009, for POM 11-15. Fiscal guidance refers to the total 
obligation authority, by fiscal year, available to the Services. Fiscal/programming guidance is 
used by the Services to develop their POMs, or changes to the previous POM, which are 
usually due in August. They begin development of their POMs in the last few months of the 
prior year (October-December timeframe). While draft fiscal/programming guidance is often 
released earlier, final fiscal/programming guidance is usually issued too late to be useful. 
Today, fiscal/programming guidance is found in the “fiscally informed” Guidance for the 
Development of the Force (GDF) and the “fiscally constrained” Joint Programming Guidance 
(JPG) (Church & Warner, 2009, p. 84). The predecessor to the GDF was the Strategic 
Planning Guidance (SPG), and before the SPG, the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). 
Originally envisioned to align strategy with investments, the GDF appears to have become a 
“wish list of programs and priorities for every constituency.” Feedback from the Services on 
the usefulness of the GDF and JPG is mixed. As indicated, both documents, but especially 





and decisions have been made to fund or not fund various weapons systems programs 
(Church & Warner, 2009, pp. 81-82). 
Understandably, and working at a disadvantage with unclear programming guidance, 
the Service POMs are invariably criticized for failing to comply with the GDF/JPG. In 
addition, the POMs are faulted for underestimating technology risks associated with 
weapons systems investments (Christie, 2008, p. 212). As a result, the Services tend to over 
program, believing they can develop, produce, and place in operation many more programs 
than realistically possible (Christie, 2008, p. 196; Church & Warner, 2009, p. 82). In other 
words, their 6-year programs fail to consider the cost “tails” past the last year of the FYDP. 
This is particularly a problem with weapons systems production programs that build up to an 
unrealistically high “bow wave” of procurement funding beyond the FYDP that becomes 
unaffordable for the Service and the DoD.  
Per DoD Directive 7045.14, the official linkage between the PPBE and acquisition 
management systems is achieved by designated membership on the Defense Systems 
Acquisition Review Council (now the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB)), the Defense 
Resources Board (now the Deputy’s Advisory Working Group (DAWG)), and the Senior 
Leader Review Group (SLRG); and the requirement to develop an acquisition strategy for all 
major systems (DoD, 1984, reissued 1987, p. 6). The DAB is chaired by the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, who is also a member of the 
SLRG and DAWG. The SLRG is chaired by the Secretary of Defense, and the DAWG is 
chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, neither of whom sits on the DAB. In total, 11 
senior leaders are members of both the DAB and the SLRG/DAWG.7 The average tenure of 
the DAE is just 24 months.8 Most MDAPs have development cycles that exceed the tenure 
of four or even five DAEs. Therefore, the effectiveness of having senior leaders serve as the 
linkage between the resourcing and acquisition management systems might be questioned, 
given their enormous responsibilities and brief tenures serving as the DAE. Certainly, 11 
senior leaders cannot be held responsible for coordinating the multitude of interactions 
between the acquisition and budgeting systems. 
Recommendations 
In 1979, the Defense Resource Management Study (DRMS) recommended to 
President Carter that the programming and budgeting phases of PPBE be combined into a 
single annual review. The DRMS also recommended that the time freed up by combining 
the two phases be used to “focus additional attention on the strategic and resource planning 
issues, including resolution of selected major issues prior to the program/budget review” 
                                                
7 The members of both the DAB and the SLRG/DAWG are as follows: Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Secretaries of the Military 
Departments; Under Secretary of Defense (Policy); Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); Under Secretary 
of Defense (Personnel and Readiness); Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence); Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Networks and Information Integration/DoD Chief Information Officer; Director, Cost Assessment 
and Program Evaluation (DoD, 2008b, encls. 3 & 4; DoD, 2009, p. 10.2.1). 
8 From Richard Godwin, the first Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) until Ashton Carter, the 
current Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, average tenure has 
been 24 months. To date, the shortest service was by Godwin, who served 12 months (September 
1986–September 1987), and the longest service was by Jacques Gansler, who served 38 months 





(Rice, 1979, p. viii). This was the centerpiece of the DRMS proposal, and it was designed to 
open up a “broad planning window” that would include “an orchestrated OSD review and 
prioritization of the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council-approved programs 
competing for segments of the planning wedge” (Rice, 1979, pp. 9, 16). These 
recommendations were not implemented. However, in 2003, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld 
did combine programming and budgeting phases, but not with the intention of freeing up 
time for better planning. Rather, Rumsfeld’s Management Initiative Decision 913 specified 
that the freed up time would be used for an execution review (i.e., the new “E” in PPBE) to 
“make assessments concerning current and previous resource allocations and whether the 
department achieved its planned performance goals” (DoD, 2003, p. 7; Church & Warner, 
2009, p. 81; Dawe & Jones, 2005, p. 49; Jones & McCaffery, 2005, p. 90). The Pentagon 
has yet to institutionalize this execution review. A recent survey of 575 professionals in the 
defense finance and accounting community found that, due to the wartime supplemental 
funding for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, emphasis on execution had not made the 
relationship between budget execution and performance more visible, nor had it provided 
the data needed to make more timely decisions to improve the PPBE process (ASMC & 
Grant Thornton, 2008, pp. 5-7). Perhaps, the “broad planning window” recommendation of 
the DRMS should again be considered, and this time implemented, to help resolve and 
clarify competing requirements and acquisition programs before the Services have to 
prepare their POMs. 
In 2007, Capability Portfolio Management was introduced to the programming phase 
of PPBE. The official definition of Capability Portfolio Management is “the process of 
integrating, synchronizing, and coordinating DoD capabilities needs with current and 
planned DOTMLPF investments within a capability portfolio to better inform decision making 
and optimize defense resources” (DoD, 2008a, p. 8). The Capability Portfolio Management 
initiative seeks to place all current and proposed warfighting needs into logical, manageable 
functional categories. In an effort to minimize redundant capabilities, capability portfolios are 
joint, not Service-specific. Capability Portfolio Managers (CPMs) provide cross-Component 
alternatives and recommendations on current and future capability needs and investments. 
They are to work with the JROC and the JCIDS, and develop capability planning guidance 
for inclusion in the GDF. Therefore, CPMs can impact capability portfolio composition, 
weapons systems acquisition, and weapons systems sustainment choices. In retrospect, the 
job of the CPMs is similar to the system analysts of the McNamara era. The systems 
analysts prepared “cost-effectiveness studies” and “requirements studies” at the request of 
the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Hitch, 1965, pp. 73-75). However, the 
advice of current-day CPMs is officially sought only at the end of the programming phase of 
PPBE when they provide the DAWG with independent programmatic recommendations and 
cross-Component perspectives on planned and proposed capability investments (DoD, 
2008a, p. 6). To have greatest influence, decision-makers need to formally tap into the 
advice of these CPMs about 9 to 12 months earlier, during the planning phase of the PPBE 
process.  
The deliberate, evolutionary pace of the Cold War is long past. The challenges of an 
ever-changing global security environment and the rapid pace of technological advancement 
represent a national imperative for the Pentagon to seek out and cultivate breakthrough 
ideas in the development and employment of defense systems (Johnson, 2003, pp. 6-7). To 
meet these challenges, the PPBE planning phase should be revitalized and extended to 
allow time for brainstorming and germination of innovative ideas and for the analysis of the 






As implemented today, the PPBE process is far different from the PPBS established 
by Secretary of Defense McNamara in 1961. Over the course of nearly 50 years, changes 
have severely de-emphasized decision-making in the planning phase. As a result, the 
Department has had to establish a separate requirements analysis and approval system. 
The concept behind today's JCIDS was actually part of McNamara's long-range planning to 
determine the most cost-effective capability outcomes. Likewise, in McNamara’s 
management system, weapons systems development and production decisions, along with 
necessary funding adjustments, were made in real time, and at the same time as 
requirements decisions. Today, the linkage between PPBE and weapons systems decisions 
suffers from the timing disconnect between a calendar-driven budget and event-driven 
acquisition programs. To improve acquisition decision-making, the linkages between the 
requirements, budgeting, and acquisition decision-making systems must be reestablished. 
One solution is to reinvigorate the planning phase of PPBE and make the necessary 
decisions on weapons systems requirements, multi-year budgeting, and acquisition program 
continuation or termination, within the timeframe of that phase.  
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Appendix 
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms 
ACAT Acquisition Category 
ADM Acquisition Decision Memorandum or Acquisition Decision 
Memoranda 
AE Acquisition Executive 
AoA Analysis of Alternatives 
ASMC American Society of Military Comptrollers 
BES Budget Estimate Submission 
CAE Component Acquisition Executive 
CBA Capability-based Assessment 
CDD Capability Development Document 
CDR Critical Design Review 
CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 
CPM Capability Portfolio Manager 
DAB Defense Acquisition Board 
DAE Defense Acquisition Executive 
DAMS Defense Acquisition Management System 
DAPA Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment 
DAWG Deputy’s Advisory Working Group 
DoD Department of Defense 
DoDD Department of Defense Directive 
DoDI Department of Defense Instruction 
DOTMLPF Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, 
Personnel, and Facilities 
DPG Defense Planning Guidance 
DRMS Defense Resource Management Study 
encl. enclosure 
EPP Enhanced Planning Process 
FRP Full Rate Production 
FY Fiscal Year 
FYDP Future Years Defense Program 
GAO Government Accountability Office 
GDF Guidance for the Development of the Force 





ICD Initial Capabilities Document 
JCIDS Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 
JPG Joint Planning Guidance 
JROC Joint Requirements Oversight Council 
JS Joint Staff 
MDA Milestone Decision Authority 
MDAP Major Defense Acquisition Program 
NDS National Defense Strategy 
NMS National Military Strategy 
NSS National Security Strategy 
OMB Office of Management and Budget 
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 
ORD Operational Requirements Document 
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 
PA&E Program Analysis and Evaluation 
PBD Program Budget Decision 
PDM Program Decision Memorandum 
PDR Preliminary Design Review 
PEO Program Executive Office or Program Executive Officer 
POM Program Objective Memorandum or Program Objective Memoranda 
PPBE Planning, Programming, Budget, and Execution 
PPBS Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System 
QDR Quadrennial Defense Review 
RDA Research, Development, and Acquisition 
RDT&E Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation 
SAE Service Acquisition Executive 
























2003 - 2010 Sponsored Research Topics 
Acquisition Management 
 Acquiring Combat Capability via Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
 BCA: Contractor vs. Organic Growth 
 Defense Industry Consolidation 
 EU-US Defense Industrial Relationships 
 Knowledge Value Added (KVA) + Real Options (RO) Applied to Shipyard 
Planning Processes  
 Managing the Services Supply Chain 
 MOSA Contracting Implications 
 Portfolio Optimization via KVA + RO 
 Private Military Sector 
 Software Requirements for OA 
 Spiral Development 
 Strategy for Defense Acquisition Research 
 The Software, Hardware Asset Reuse Enterprise (SHARE) repository 
Contract Management 
 Commodity Sourcing Strategies 
 Contracting Government Procurement Functions 
 Contractors in 21st-century Combat Zone 
 Joint Contingency Contracting 
 Model for Optimizing Contingency Contracting, Planning and Execution 
 Navy Contract Writing Guide 
 Past Performance in Source Selection 
 Strategic Contingency Contracting 
 Transforming DoD Contract Closeout 
 USAF Energy Savings Performance Contracts 
 USAF IT Commodity Council 
 USMC Contingency Contracting 
Financial Management 
 Acquisitions via Leasing: MPS case 
 Budget Scoring 





 Capital Budgeting for the DoD 
 Energy Saving Contracts/DoD Mobile Assets 
 Financing DoD Budget via PPPs 
 Lessons from Private Sector Capital Budgeting for DoD Acquisition Budgeting 
Reform 
 PPPs and Government Financing 
 ROI of Information Warfare Systems 
 Special Termination Liability in MDAPs 
 Strategic Sourcing 
 Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) to Improve Cost Estimates 
Human Resources 
 Indefinite Reenlistment 
 Individual Augmentation 
 Learning Management Systems 
 Moral Conduct Waivers and First-tem Attrition 
 Retention 
 The Navy’s Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Management System 
 Tuition Assistance 
Logistics Management 
 Analysis of LAV Depot Maintenance 
 Army LOG MOD 
 ASDS Product Support Analysis 
 Cold-chain Logistics 
 Contractors Supporting Military Operations 
 Diffusion/Variability on Vendor Performance Evaluation 
 Evolutionary Acquisition 
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 Naval Aviation Maintenance and Process Improvement (2) 
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 PBL (4) 
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 Risk Analysis for Performance-based Logistics 
 R-TOC AEGIS Microwave Power Tubes 
 Sense-and-Respond Logistics Network 
 Strategic Sourcing 
Program Management 
 Building Collaborative Capacity 
 Business Process Reengineering (BPR) for LCS Mission Module Acquisition 
 Collaborative IT Tools Leveraging Competence 
 Contractor vs. Organic Support 
 Knowledge, Responsibilities and Decision Rights in MDAPs 
 KVA Applied to AEGIS and SSDS 
 Managing the Service Supply Chain 
 Measuring Uncertainty in Earned Value 
 Organizational Modeling and Simulation 
 Public-Private Partnership 
 Terminating Your Own Program 
 Utilizing Collaborative and Three-dimensional Imaging Technology 
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